

# Knowledge reports with(out) true belief

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## The factive inference

'Factive' verbs trigger the inference that the proposition that they embed is true.

- (1) Tunc knows that Trump won.  
Tunc doesn't know that Trump won.  
↔ Trump won. (factive)
- (2) Tunc {says, thinks} that Trump won.  
↗ Trump won. (non-factive)

The FI can be encoded as a presupposition

- (3)  $[[\text{know}]](w)(p_{st})(x_e)$  is defined iff  $p$  is true at  $w$   
 $[[\text{know}]](w)(p_{st})(x_e)$  is true iff  $x$  thinks  $p$  at  $w$

**Hypothesis** (to be refined):

The FI is a property of the matrix verb.

**The view from Turkish:**

The FI arises in the composition.

## The factive inference alternates in Turkish

The availability of the factive inference is conditioned by clause type.

- Under predicates like *bil-*, 'know,' *anla-*, 'understand,' *hatırla-*, 'remember,' ...  
Nominalizations: Factive inference      Tensed clauses: No factive inference
- (4) Tunç [Trump'ın kazandığını] biliyor.      (5) Tunç [Trump kazandı diye] biliyor.  
T. Tr. win.NMZ know      T. Tr. win.PST diye know  
≈ Tunc knows that Trump won.      ≈ Tunc believes that Trump won.  
↔ Trump won      ↗ Trump won

This is unexpected if the matrix verb is factive and clauses compose uniformly.

**Question:** What gives rise to the factive inference in Turkish?

**Answer:** The inference arises in the composition.

Tests	Sentences	
	(4) NMZ	(5) tensed
Ok with denial of embedded clause?	No (modulo focus)	Yes
Ok with prior assertion of embedded clause?	Yes	No
Hey wait a minute!	Yes	No
Does the inference project?	Yes	NA

## Proposal


The factive inference is 'built up' in the syntactic/semantic composition.

The definition of *bil-*

- (6)  $[[\text{bil}]](w_s)(p_{st})(q_{st})(x_e) = 1$  iff  
There is a proper acquaintance  $R$  s.t.  
the situation  $s$  that  $x$  is acquainted with through  $R$  at  $w$  satisfies  $p$ , and  $x$  believes that the situation that she is acquainted with satisfies  $q$ .

$p$  and  $q$  are independent predicates.


A minimal structure



Situations: [3, 5]; De re belief based on acquaintance: [2]; Knowledge as de re belief about situations: [4].

Deriving the non-factive alternant (5)

$p$  and  $q$  may mismatch.




$p$  valued contextually/ $\exists$ -closed.  
 $q$  expressed by *diye* clause.

- (7)  $[[5]](w_0) = 1$  iff  $\exists R$  s.t.  
the situation  $s$  that Tunç is acquainted with through  $R$  at  $w_0$  is the US presidential election, and Tunç believes that the  $s$  he is acquainted with includes a Tr. victory.

Deriving the factive alternant (4)

$p$  and  $q$  must match.



$p$  is bound by the nominalization.

- (8)  $[[4]](w_0) = 1$  iff  $\exists R$  s.t.  
the situation  $s$  that Tunç is acquainted with through  $R$  at  $w_0$  includes a Trump victory, and Tunç believes that the  $s$  he is acquainted with includes a Tr. victory.

## Thanks & References

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### References

- [1] Abrusán. Predicting the presuppositions of soft triggers. *L&P*, 2011.  
[2] Charlow and Sharvit. Bound 'de re' pronouns and the LFs of attitude reports. *S&P*, 2014.  
[3] Kratzer. An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought. *L&P*, 1989.  
[4] Kratzer. Facts: Particulars or information units? *L&P*, 2002.  
[5] Kratzer. Situations in natural language semantics. *SEP*, 2016.  
[6] Moulton. Natural selection and the syntax of clausal complementation, 2009.

## More on embedded clauses

Nominalizations are not always facts.

$[[p + \text{NMZ}]] \not\approx$  the fact that  $p$

- (9) [Trump'ın kazandığını] düşünüyor.  
Tr. win.NMZ think  
Tunc thinks that Trump won.  
↗ Trump won

⇒ Source of FI is not the nominalization.

Tensed clauses are direct content.

$[[diye + \text{CP}]] \not\approx [[\text{MODAL}]]([\text{CP}])$

In a context where (5) is true the attitude holder would assent to:  
✓ Trump won.  
# According to me ( $\approx?$  *diye*), Trump won.

⇒ Lack of FI not due to 'plugging.'

## Concluding remarks

Regular factors condition the FI in Turkish.

⇒ The FI is derived, rather than being a property of attitude verbs, or of clauses.

Proposal: **Matching/mismatching de re beliefs about situations.**

Other Turkic langs (ongoing, Travis Major), Korean [6], Hungarian [1], etc., have it too!

## Speculation

**Further work:** Unpacking the complexity of 'factive' verbs into the interpretation of tensed clauses and nominalizations.

**Attitudes** denote **non-veridical states.**

*diye* introduces (non-veridical) **content.**

Nominalizations → **scope ambiguities.**

Eval  $w$ : Factive; Belief  $ws$ : Non-factive.